Th e aim of the article is to assess how much rebalancing of the six eurozone troubled economies (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus) was achieved since the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis in 2007/2008, to what extent migrations were a mitigating factor on their labor markets and how much the troubled countries were assisted in their adjustment by other countries. Th e fi rst part of the article shows an overall macroeconomic picture of the troubled economies' rebalancing together with a presentation of the etiology of the problem (i.e. accumulation of imbalances). Th e second part presents the role of migrations and the third part the role of the Eurosystem and international fi nancial assistance in the rebalancing process. Th e research is based on comparing developments in selected indicators across countries. Th e conclusions are that the rebalancing in the troubled countries was either at most limited or actually their economies continued to fall out of balance (various indicators showing various developments make the situation ambiguous), migrations were either not much supportive for rebalancing of the troubled economies or they did not provide any dent to unemployment at all and that the troubled countries were provided with signifi cant international assistance mainly in the form of the ECB policies causing the rise in the Target balances.
Introduction
Th e eurozone countries have restricted policy options to balance their economies, both internally and externally, as compared to countries using exchange rate arrangements that allow for exchange rate adjustment. When confronted with a crisis having its roots in deteriorated international competitiveness of their economies, the eurozone countries, assuming they want to remain in the monetary union, cannot rely on currency depreciation to help improve their external position and their adjustment has to be based on other mechanisms like internal devaluation, its soft er version of still positive infl ation rate, but one lower relative to the rates experienced by trading partners or even restricting transactions recorded in their balances of payments (foreign trade restrictions, capital controls). Assuming that they want to stick to the trade and capital movement freedoms, they are left with the options of internal devaluation or relatively low infl ation rate. Unfortunately, when prices and wages are rigid downwards, as generally is the case, internal devaluation is painful, particularly in terms of lost GDP and high unemployment. Th e second option of relatively low infl ation rate would probably require that the more competitive eurozone countries operating at low unemployment would have to accept "overheating" of their economies, which is also problematic. Whichever path is chosen, the adjustment process can be alleviated (i.e. rebalancing can be slowed down) through international assistance, while unemployment can be additionally moderated through emigration.
Since the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis in 2007/2008 we have been witnessing painful adjustment in the six eurozone troubled economies, i.e. in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, aft er fi nancial markets became aware that international competitiveness of these countries' economies had deteriorated and their private and public sectors might have become unable to repay their debts. Th e cost of adjustment has not only been borne by these states, but also by other members of the eurozone, who have provided fi nancial assistance or have experienced the consequences of the European Central Bank accommodative policy. Th is external assistance did not come easy though. In the last few years the eurozone has been going through a strife on the conditions and volumes of interstate fi nancial assistance, the ECB policy, possible mutualization of state debts, on how to deal with failing banks and so on. In general this strife may be seen as one about how the burden of adjustment of the troubled countries should be shared among the eurozone member states.
Th e aim of this article is to assess how much rebalancing of the eurozone troubled countries' economies was achieved since the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis in 2007/2008 , to what extent migrations were a mitigating factor on their labor markets and how much the troubled countries were assisted in their adjustment by other countries. Th e fi rst part of the article shows an overall macroeconomic picture of the troubled economies' rebalancing together with a presentation of the etiology of the problem (i.e. accumulation of imbalances), which might off er some clue into how much adjustment is supposed to return the troubled economies to balance and as a point of reference to what was actually achieved. Th en the article focuses on specifi c issues that in the author's opinion are important aspects of rebalancing of the troubled countries' economies. Th e second part presents the role of migrations and the third part the role of the Eurosystem and international fi nancial assistance in the rebalancing process. Th e author thinks that omitting these issues would render the analysis of the rebalancing incomplete. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
Th e research is based on comparing developments in selected indicators across countries. Th e fi rst two parts of the article are based on the Eurostat data. Th e analysis presented in the third part of the article uses both the Eurostat and the Ifo Institute data.
Macropicture
A good starting point for analyzing rebalancing of the eurozone troubled economies might be to establish, how large these imbalances were before the rebalancing started. Looking at the eurozone crisis as a balance-of-payments one should be of use here. Current developments in the eurozone show that too much of international capital fl ows to the troubled countries prior to the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis were not used for sound investment improving the economy's production capacity that subsequently allows to repay creditors and increase domestic spending. How did it come about? Sinn [2013, p. 3] reminds that before the introduction of the euro the "southern" states and private sectors had to pay much higher interest rates than the "northern" ones and these diff erences in interest rates disappeared in the second half of the 1990s because investors perceived the Eurosystem as a protection against state bankruptcy and private bankruptcies subordinate to it. Feldstein [2011, p. 5] likewise points that due to the creation of the monetary union interest rates fell in some of the eurozone countries and this brought increased borrowing on the part of households to fi nance home building and on the part of governments to fi nance defi cits accompanying social transfers, whereas bond buyers in spite of the "no bailout" clause in the Maastricht Treaty assumed bonds issued by all the governments in the eurozone to be equally safe. Krugman [2012] similarly states that the introduction of the euro led many investors to believe that crossborder investment within the eurozone became much less risky. When fi nancial markets realized that they had been overoptimistic about investing in the south of the eurozone and in Ireland, the stage for rebalancing was set, which created a serious problem both for the eurozone creditor and debtor countries.
On the basis of the presented views one might assume that imbalances started to accumulate about the time of the euro introduction or earlier. According to the opinion presented by Sinn, who draws attention to the European Council meeting in Madrid in December of 1995 as a point in time when the euro was defi nitively announced and aft er which the interest-rate spreads between the "southern" and "northern" states disappeared within two years [Sinn, 2013, p. 3] , one might assume that 1995 could be a starting point for this analysis, at least for the countries that were the members of the eurozone from its creation in 1999. Taking the abovementioned views into account time series presented below start between 1995 and 2001. Th e exact choices of the points of departure were driven by the need to present clearly the developments before the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis, ensure data comparability and were also dependent on the availability of the statistics. Indicators present the situation not only in the six troubled countries but also for the whole euro area composed of 17 states (the EA17) and Germany in order to place the developments in the troubled countries in the eurozone perspective.
As it can be seen on Chart 1, the troubled countries' balances of payments signifi cantly worsened prior to the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis. In 1995 Ireland and Italy recorded current account surpluses of 2,5% and 2,2% of GDP respectively, Portugal and Spain were almost balanced, while Germany recorded a 1,2% defi cit. Defi cits of Greece and Cyprus (which joined the eurozone in 2001 and 2008 respectively) were then at 2,2%. In 2000, Ireland and Italy had almost balanced current accounts and Germany was still in defi cit, but defi cits of Portugal, Spain, Greece and Cyprus reached 10,3%, 4,0%, 7,8% and 5,4% respectively. Up until 2003 current accounts of the troubled countries improved or at least did not worsen markedly but aft erwards they started to deteriorate again and in 2008 the defi cit in Italy reached 2,9%, in Ireland 5,6%, in Spain 9,6%, in Portugal 12,6%, in Greece 14,9% and in Cyprus 15,6%. Th en, in the context of the eurozone crisis, current accounts of the troubled countries improved. In 2012 Ireland recorded a 5,0% surplus, while defi cits of Portugal, Spain and Italy stood only at -1,5%, -1,1% and 0,7% respectively. Defi cits of Greece and Cyprus were still signifi cant at 3,1% and 6,5% respectively. Yet one should take note of the data for the fi rst quarter of 2013 that show increased current account defi cits for Italy (1,6%), Greece (5,7%) and Cyprus (12, 4%) . Th e German current account surplus did not come below 6,0% since 2006, while the current account of the eurozone from the start of its existence remained largely in balance. In general current account defi cits that arose prior to the crisis largely reversed aft erwards, but the German surplus did not adjust to assist the troubled economies in their rebalancing. Th us the other eurozone countries have recorded deteriorations in their current accounts, in particular France (from 0,5% surplus in 2005 to 2,4% defi cit in the fi rst quarter of 2013) and Belgium (from 1,9% surplus in 2007 to 3,3% defi cit in the fi rst quarter of 2013).
Developments in the current accounts presented above are refl ected in the net international investment position (IIP) statistics shown on Chart 2, where one can observe diverging paths for Germany and the six troubled countries. Since the introduction of the euro, Germany recorded a growth trend in its net IIP (a rise from 0,4% of GDP in 1998 S o u r c e: based on the Eurostat data.
Th e fall in interest rates in the troubled countries together with changed investors' attitudes refl ected themselves in increased credit fl ow both into the troubled countries' private and general government sectors (Charts 3 and 4 respectively). In 1995 the private credit fl ow statistics were as follows: 1,3% of GDP in Germany, 9,1% in Portugal, 3,8% in Spain, 4,6% in Italy, 1,8% in Greece, 16,1% in Cyprus. Th ey rose in the second half of the 1990s and in 1999 they reached 8,3% in Germany, 18,6% in Portugal, 15,2% in Spain, 8,4% in Italy, 10,2% in Greece and 18,5% in Cyprus. At the beginning of the 2000s private credit fl ow in the troubled economies moderated to rise again to very high levels prior to the crisis reaching 44,4% in Ireland in 2006 , 20,5% in Portugal in 2007 , 36,0% in Spain in 2006 , 12,4% in Italy in 2007 , 17,0% in Greece in 2007 Th us the adjustment with respect to private credit fl ow has been even stronger than the rise prior to the crisis. In the area of public fi nances no signifi cant deterioration recorded an average annual surplus of 1,5% of GDP and the Spanish one of 0,5%, while in the other troubled countries average annual defi cits were as follows: 4,2% in Portugal, 2,9% in Italy, 5,4% in Greece and 2,5% in Cyprus. Th e EA17 and Germany recorded on average defi cits of 1,9% and 2,3% in this period. Public fi nances in the troubled countries dramatically deteriorated only aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis and in the period 2009-2012 an average annual defi cit in Ireland reached 16,4%, in Portugal 7,7%, in Spain 10,2%, in Italy 4,2%, in Greece 11,5% and in Cyprus 6,0%, while for the EA17 and Germany it was 5,1% and 2,0% respectively. Th e stock equivalents of the above presented credit fl ows, i.e. debt statistics for private and general government sectors (Charts 5 and 6 respectively) are also interesting facets of the eurozone adjustment challenge. It is worthwhile to note that private debt in Germany stood at 108,4% of GDP in 1995, rose to 128,0% in 2001 and then started falling to reach 107,6% in 2012. In 1995 Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek private sectors were less in debt than the German one -at 76,7%, 76,6%, 71,5% and 41,6% respectively. , in Portugal by 6,9 p.p., in Italy by 7,1 p.p., in Greece by 11,2 p.p. and in Cyprus by 46,8 p.p.). Only in Spain the ratio declined, but only by 2,5 p.p., thus aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis there was practically no adjustment in the troubled countries in their private debt levels. As concerns general government debt levels, the German one rose from 55,6% of GDP in 1995 to 65,2% in 2007. Th e Portuguese, Greek and Cypriot general government debt ratios in this period also rose by about 10 p.p. (the Portuguese one from 59,2% to 68,4%, the Greek one from 97,0% to 107,4% and the Cypriot one from 51,8% to 58,8%), while the ratio for Ireland fell from 80,1% to just 25,1%, for Spain from 63,3% to just 36,3% and for Italy from 120,9% to 103,3%. It was only aft er 2007 when general government debt-to-GDP ratios dramatically deteriorated. For the EA17 the ratio rose from 66,4% in 2007 to 90,6% in 2012. In Germany in 2012 it reached 81,9% (16,7 p.p. more than in 2007), in Ireland 117,6% (92,5 p.p. more), in Portugal 123,6% (55,2 p.p. more), in Spain 84,2% (47,9 p.p. more), in Italy 127,0% (23,7 p.p. more), in Greece 156,9% (49,5 p.p. more despite a "haircut" in 2012) and in Cyprus 85,8% (27,0 p.p. more). Another interesting facet of adjustment in the troubled countries is also the GDP dynamics presented on Chart 7. Prior to 2008 the economies of the six troubled countries generally grew well in comparison with the economies of the whole EA17 area or Germany (in large part due to the infl ow of foreign capital, the scale of which was already refl ected on Chart 2), but aft er 2009 the situation reversed. In the period 2000-2007, when the average annual rate of economic growth in the EA17 was 2,2% and in Germany 1,6%, the rate for Ireland was 5,8%, for Portugal 1,5%, for Spain 3,6%, for Italy 1,6%, for Greece 4,2% and for Cyprus 3,8%. But in the period 2010-2012, when the average annual rate of growth for the EA17 area was 1,0% and for Germany 2,6%, the Ireland's economy grew on average by only 0,5% a year and the other troubled countries' economies were shrinking: the Portuguese by 1,0%, the Spanish by 0,4%, the Italian by 0,1%, the Greek by 6,1% and the Cypriot by 0,2%. Th ese disappointing growth rates made it diffi cult for the troubled countries to show improved economic indicators that have a country's GDP in denominator. Although using such indicators may underestimate the troubled countries' eff orts to balance their economies, the disappointing growth rates do not allow to perceive the indicators for and the perspectives of these countries in a more positive, special way. Th e GDP dynamics refl ected itself on the troubled economies' labor markets, which can be seen on Chart 8. Th e situation in the EA17 labor market improved in the period 1995-2007 as the unemployment rate fell from 10,7% to 7,6%. In 2007 the situation in Ireland, Italy and Cyprus was better than the average for the EA17, while in Germany, Portugal, Spain and Greece the unemployment rates were in the 8,3-8,9% range. Yet aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis unemployment in the EA17 increased markedly, especially in the troubled economies. In the fi rst quarter of 2013 the seasonally adjusted rate of unemployment in the EA17 stood at 12,0%, while in Ireland it reached 13,7%, in Portugal 17,6%, in Spain 26,4%, in Italy 11,9%, in Greece 26,6% and in Cyprus 14,7%. Th ese developments are contrasted by the situation in Germany, where in the fi rst quarter of 2013 this rate fell to 5,4%. It is worth to take note of the situation in the two countries recording especially high unemployment rates, i.e. Spain and Greece. In Spain the dire situation on the labor market might be associated with especially large employment creation accompanying the infl ow of foreign capital to Spain prior to the crisis outbreak and subsequent reversal of the situation. In 2008 in Spain there were 38,5% more employed (aged 15 or over) than in 1999 (in construction 56,0% more), whereas for the EA17 area (excluding Malta) the employment grew by 14,5%. In Greece it grew by 12,8%, thus below the EA17 average, but Greece experienced especially dramatic GDP contraction in recent years compared to the other troubled economies (see Chart 7), which is one of the main factors explaining its particularly high unemployment rate. In order to assess the progress in rebalancing of the troubled economies one also needs to look at a few indicators showing changes in their international competitiveness. Credit fl owing into the troubled economies prior to the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis has contributed to rising price levels, which is problematic for a country that does not have an option to let its currency depreciate. As it can be seen on Chart 9, prices measured by the GDP defl ator (based on euro) in 2007 were 18,1% higher in the whole EA17 area than in 1999. In this period prices in Germany rose only by 6,8%, while in Ireland by 33,1%, in Portugal by 26,8%, in Spain by 36,7%, in Italy by 21,2%, in Greece by 22,7% and in Cyprus by 29,8%. Such rises have deprived the troubled countries of some of their competitiveness, especially in comparison with Germany, but then changes in price levels in the context of the eurozone crisis became more supportive for their competitiveness. Whereas prices both in the EA17 and in Germany in 2012 were 4,3% higher than in 2008, prices in Ireland fell by 5,3% in this period, so this country achieved a signifi cant adjustment in price levels. Unfortunately developments in other troubled countries were not so positive for their competitiveness. Prices in Portugal, Spain and Greece rose by 1,9%, 1,6% and 3,8% respectively, so their adjustment was very modest compared to the EA17 and Germany. Yet prices in Italy and Cyprus rose by 5,5% and 6,9% so they recorded further (though slight) losses relative to the EA17 and Germany. Changes in nominal unit labor costs (NULC) are another indicator helpful in assessing an economy's competitiveness. As it is illustrated on Chart 10, the NULC in Germany in 2008 were almost at the same level as in 2001, while in the EA17 they grew by 12,8%, in Ireland by 33,2%, in Portugal by 18,4%, in Spain by 27,1%, in Italy by 21,7%, in Greece by 27,2% and in Cyprus by 23,8% (an explanation concerning the data on Cyprus is presented in [*] on Chart 10). Aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis some of the troubled countries recovered part of their losses from the pre-crisis period. Whereas in 2012 NULC in the whole EA17 rose by 6,1% as compared to 2008 and in and in Germany by 9,0%, in Ireland they fell by 13,8%, in Portugal by 2,7%, in Spain by 5,4% Greece by 2,3%. Unfortunately, the situation in Italy and Cyprus barely changed relative to the EA17 and Germany in this period, so the picture of adjustment in NULC is uneven across the troubled economies. A useful complement to presenting the developments in NULC, helpful in explaining their nature is to show developments in labor productivity. Chart 11 evidences that in the period 2002-2008 real labor productivity per hour worked recorded the biggest rise among the troubled countries in Greece (21,5%), then Ireland (12,2%), Cyprus (10,2%), which recorded almost the same rise as Germany (9,9%), then Portugal (6,7%) and Spain (5,3%). Italy recorded virtually no rise (0,3%). Th e rate for the EA17 was 7,3%. Th ese data evidence that before 2009 Germany did not record any outstanding rise in productivity, which points at controlling wages (and thus prices as it can be seen on Chart 9) as a factor allowing to keep their NULC under control. Th e six troubled economies obviously did not manage to keep wages growth in line with growth in productivity in order to restrain rises in NULC.
An economy's relative competitiveness towards its trade partners can be also assessed by observing changes in real eff ective exchange rates (REER). In 2008 the REER for the EA17 was 11,5% higher than in 1999 and the change in REER for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus was quite similar for that period (12,3%, 15,7%, 7,4% and 14,8% respectively) as it is visualized on Chart 12. Yet the REER for Ireland rose by 37,3% and for Spain by 21,7% in that time, which means that their economies lost some of their international competitiveness relative to the EA17. In the same period the REER for Germany fell by 10,8% meaning that the country gained in competitiveness relative to the EA17. Aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis the pattern of the REER dynamics in the eurozone changed. In 2012 the REER for the EA17 fell by 7,8% relative to 2008 and in Germany it fell only by 2,1% meaning that it lost some of its price competitiveness relative to the EA17. In this period the REER for Ireland fell by 23,4%, for Spain by 13,3%, for Greece by 12,4% and for Portugal by 8,7%, thus they gained in competitiveness relative to the EA17 and their adjustment was quite substantial relative to changes in the pre-crisis period. Th e REER for Italy and Cyprus did not change much (-3,3% and 1,0% respectively). Although the developments in the crisis countries were diverse, none of them managed to recover losses relative to Germany from before the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis. Th e developments presented above are summarized in Table 1 . Th e troubled countries' rebalancing eff ort seen through the lens of the fl ow indicators (largely reversed current account defi cits, dramatic fall in private credit fl ows, increased public lending) is partly positive. Yet when the rebalancing is being considered looking at their stock counterparts, i.e. no adjustment or deterioration in net IIP positions and private indebtedness and also dramatic rises in public debt statistics, the picture becomes really worrisome, especially when one looks at weak GDP dynamics and dramatic rise in unemployment rates. Th e indicators showing changes in international price competitiveness of the troubled economies, i.e. infl ation rates, nominal unit labor costs and real eff ective exchange rates, though providing a mixed picture, also do not seem to evidence signifi cant rebalancing. 
Migrations
High unemployment rates in the eurozone troubled countries evidence not only the severity of their economic situation, but also, together with low German unemployment fi gures, suggest lacking geographic labor mobility between the eurozone member states. Yet labor mobility is one of the crucial factors determining whether a given currency area is "optimal". According to Mundell [1961] high level of geographic labor mobility supports the functioning of fi xed exchange rate systems.
Unfortunately empirical analyses show that geographic labor mobility in the eurozone is low [L' Angevin, 2007; Gáková, Dijkstra, 2008; Broyer et al. 2011; Bräuninger, Majowski, 2011] . Feldstein [2011] and Krugman [2012] consider low geographic labor mobility as one of the main problems of the eurozone in the context of its systemic crisis. Feldstein warned against the introduction of the common currency within the EU a few years prior to the euro inauguration highlighting low geographic labor mobility among European nations and vulnerability of the EU countries to asymmetric shocks [Feldstein, 1992] .
Developments in net international migrations in Germany and the six troubled countries as a proxy for labor mobility are presented on Chart 13. Th e data were computed based on changes in population between the beginning of a given and the following year and life births and deaths in a given year. Th e chart shows that some of the troubled countries started to attract markedly more immigrants prior to the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis. Th e data on net international migrations presented above suggest that only in Ireland and Portugal net emigration might have eased the situation on their labor markets to some extent aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis, whereas in Spain and Greece a vestigial net emigration could not have helped to alleviate the dire situation on their labor markets. Italy and Cyprus, despite rising unemployment, remained net immigration countries. Germany became the country of net immigration again aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis suggesting that to some extent it might have contributed to alleviating the situation on the labor markets of the troubled countries, but apparently much too little when one looks at unemployment rates there.
Th e Eurosystem and international fi nancial assistance
Th e Eurosystem contributes to a large extent to determining how the rebalancing of the troubled countries proceeds as it is responsible for the monetary policy in the eurozone. But it is argued that the Eurosystem in fact also conducts fi scal policy. According to Sinn and Wollmershäuser [2012] voluminous money creation and lending by the national central banks of the peripheral eurozone countries at the expense of money creation and lending in the core eurozone countries, which gave rise to the Target balances (i.e. claims and liabilities of the eurozone central banks versus the Eurosystem being a measure of accumulated surpluses and defi cits in balances of payments of the eurozone countries with the rest of the eurozone) constituted fi scal support understood as transferring the control of real economic resources and was a public capital fl ow helping the crisis countries just like the capital provided through the offi cial facilities to assist the eurozone countries in diffi culties (e.g. EFSF). Table 2 presents how signifi cant was the support for the troubled countries provided by the ECB policies that made the Target balances rise. We can see there that the rise in Target claims was equal to 84% of the German current account surplus in the period 2009-2012, which can be interpreted as follows: 84% of the current account surplus in Germany was used as a credit support for the troubled countries via the Eurosystem to fi nance current account defi cits and/or capital fl ight in the troubled countries. Th e table shows that the capital fl ight worth of 436% of the Irish current account surplus in 2009-2012 was fi nanced thanks to the rise in the Irish Target liabilities. One can also see there that the rise in Target liabilities allowed to fi nance 19% of the Cypriot current account defi cit, 84% of the Greek one and 92% of the Portuguese one. In case of Spain and Italy one can interpret the situation presented as follows: in these countries the rise in Target liabilities allowed for the fi nancing of the whole current account defi cit and additionally capital fl ight equal to 103% of the current account defi cit in Spain and 90% worth of current account defi cit in Italy. Th e bottom row of the table shows the Target balances of the countries in relation to their GDP to illustrate the signifi cance of the intra-Eurosystem support of the troubled economies. In fact the ECB policies that caused the rise in Target balances were the most signifi cant mechanism of de facto fi scal support of the troubled countries aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis. Th is is illustrated in Table 3 , which compares the Target balances and offi cial international support (through bilateral loans, EFSF, EFSM, ESM and IMF) for the troubled countries. We can see there that for Ireland and Portugal the assistance provided through the ECB policies leading to the Target balances was more or less equal to offi cial international assistance, the assistance to Spain and Cyprus was provided mainly through the ECB and in case of Italy only through the ECB. Only for Greece the assistance was provided mainly in the form of offi cial international programs. Th e fi nancial assistance provided to the eurozone troubled economies in the form of Target credit and offi cial assistance programs was substantial. Th is assistance alleviated the adjustment process in these countries, which explains to a large extent why the rebalancing proceeded as it is presented in the fi rst part of the article. If the assistance had not been provided, the troubled countries would have experienced much more dramatic fall in their GDP and much higher unemployment. Th ey would also have recorded stronger adjustment in their balances of payments, infl ation, unit labor costs and real eff ective exchange rates. But political consequences of such an alternative variant of adjustment might have already caused the disintegration of the eurozone in line with the dramatic scenarios presented for instance by ING [2011] or UBS [2011] .
Conclusions
Th e fi rst part of the article has shown an ambiguous picture of adjustment in the six eurozone troubled countries. Some of the presented fl ow statistics, i.e. current account balances and private credit fl ows, seem to evidence that rebalancing has been largely achieved. Unfortunately when one looks at GDP dynamics and unemployment rates together with indicators of price developments (infl ation, nominal unit labor costs, real eff ective exchange rates) rebalancing seems more Keynesian than classic in character. Other indicators presented in the fi rst part of the article, i.e. general government balances and debts, private debts and net international investment positions evidence either no rebalancing or even deterioration. All in all the situation should be interpreted as follows: the rebalancing in the troubled countries was either at most limited or actually their economies continued to fall out of balance.
To make matters worse, migrations were either not much supportive for rebalancing of the troubled economies or they did not provide any dent to unemployment at all. If such a situation persists, the social consequences of the eurozone systemic crisis will be particularly painful thus increasing the probability of political changes putting at risk further participation of the troubled countries in the monetary union or even the existence of the eurozone itself.
Even though aft er the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis Germany did not reduce its current account surplus, the troubled countries were provided with signifi cant international assistance fi rst of all from other eurozone member states, i.e. largely from Germany, and mainly in the form of the ECB policies causing the rise in Target balances. Th is assistance slowed down the rebalancing making the pain in the troubled countries less acute than it would otherwise have been without this assistance. But this assistance does not change the fact that these countries in the end have to go through painful price adjustment relative to the rest of the eurozone if they do not want to leave the monetary union. What is more, this assistance does not come without political risk and it cannot be prolonged forever. Voters in countries that are expected to foot the bill in some way (fi rst of all Germany) may fi nally decide against the monetary union. We should not also expect voters in the troubled countries to consistently support the eurozone membership, especially when they perceive the euro as a source of economic hardship and associate it with foreign pressure on their countries.
For a few years the eurozone has been in the process of a deep institutional reform. Whether these eff orts will be successful in a sense that the eurozone will not disintegrate and the troubled countries will eventually return to economic growth at full employment remains to be seen. But fi rst they need to go through painful adjustment. Leaving the eurozone in turn bears the risk of dramatic economic slump together with political turmoil. One or the other way is not an optimistic scenario, especially in the short term. We should not expect the deep eurozone problems to be easily solved in a deus ex machina fashion. It seems that the troubled countries will not enter a period of economic prosperity any time soon. Rebalancing eff ort is still ahead of them, no matter if they chose to meet the challenge inside or outside the eurozone.
